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Abstract
In the spirit of Fleurbaey et al. (2001), it is tempting to introduce more reasonable
lower and upper bounds in Atkinson and Bourguigon’s (1987) sequential general-
ized Lorenz dominance procedure. Unfortunately, our proposal leads, at best, to
an average household income criterion, which is unsuited to make heterogeneous
welfare comparisons. We therefore restrict attention to imposing either lower or
upper bounds, resulting in two new sequential dominance criteria.
1 Introduction
When income units are homogeneous in non-income characteristics, there exist many
tools to make social welfare comparisons between distributions and the properties of
these tools are well-known (Lambert, 2001 for an overview). Especially, the generalized
Lorenz dominance test seems well-accepted as a powerful tool to measure social welfare.
Unfortunately, these tools are too restrictive to make reasonable comparisons in practice,
because:
At the heart of any distributional analysis, there is the problem of allowing for differences in
people’s non-income characteristics. (Cowell and Mercader-Prats, 1999)
If we do not want to cardinalize need differences via equivalence scales (Shorrocks, 1995,
Ebert, 1997), the most well-known way to make heterogeneous welfare comparisons is
the so-called “ordinal” sequential generalized Lorenz dominance test. It boils down
to classifying households in different need types and checking –on the basis of the
generalized Lorenz dominance criterion– (i) whether the most needy are better off ,
(ii) whether the most and second most needy are better off, and so on. This result is due
to Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987), and extended by Atkinson (1992), Jenkins and
Lambert (1993), Chambaz and Maurin (1998), Lambert and Ramos (2002), and Moyes
(1999) to deal with changing demographics, poverty and/or the principle of diminishing
transfers. Related to this literature is Bourguignon’s (1989) dominance criterion–which
is a subrelation of (and thus more incomplete compared to) the sequential generalized
Lorenz dominance quasi-ordering.
The main criticism of the ordinal approach is its impossibility to assess, for example,
an income transfer from a very rich household to a poor household with lower needs.
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Recently, Fleurbaey et al. (2001) provide an intermediate criterion, which at the same (i)
deals with this criticism in a convincing way by introducing “bounded” household utility
functions, and (ii) bridges the gap between the cardinal and the ordinal approach. Their
criterion is equivalent with Ebert’s (1997,1999) cardinal approach for a set of bounded
equivalence scales. Choosing these bounds as small (resp. as wide) as possible, one
obtains Ebert’s cardinal approach (resp. Bourguignon’s “ordinal” approach).
First, we analyze whether it is also possible to consider household utility functions,
bounded from below and above, in Atkinson and Bourguignon’s “ordinal” approach.
The answer is rather dissapointing: the resulting criterion focusses on average household
income, which is of course too restrictive to make heterogeneous welfare comparisons.
Second, we look what happens when we impose either lower or upper bounds, rather
than both simultaneously. We obtain two new sequential dominance criteria, which are
basically sequential procedures applied to household incomes divided and weighted by
an equivalence scale, which is based on either the lower or the upper bounds. The first
one (based on lower bounds) is able to deal with transfers from rich households to poor
and more needy households, the second one (based on upper bounds) is able to deal
with transfers from rich households to poor and less needy households.
2 Notation
Consider household incomes y ∈ R+ and types k ∈ K = {1, ...,K} representing relevant
non-income characteristics; types are ordered from most to least needy. A heterogeneous
distribution F is a list (p1, ..., pK , F1, ..., FK), with pk the proportion of households with
type k and Fk the income distribution function of type k households, assumed to be
continuously differentiable and defined over a common finite support [0, z] (and thus
equal to one outside this support). We focus directly on the case where demographics
might change, or the proportions pk may differ between heterogeneous distributions.
Finally, we introduce (twice differentiable) household utility functions Uk : R+ → R,
measuring the utility of a household with type k as a function of its income. Social
welfare in a distribution F is measured by the average household utility in society:
W : F :→W (F ) =
[
k∈K
pk
] z
0
UkdFk. (1)
3 Welfare properties
In the first subsection, we present Atkinson and Bourguignon’s (1987) sequential gener-
alized Lorenz dominance criterion, as extended by Moyes (1999) to deal with changing
demographics. In a second subsection, we introduce bounds in the spirit of Fleurbaey
et al. (2001).
3.1 Sequential dominance
We might impose one or more of the following conditions on utility profiles (U1, . . . , UK)
(an explanation follows):
• A1: U k ≥ 0, for all k ∈ K (A1a) and U

k ≤ 0, for all k ∈ K (A1b).
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• A2: U k(y)− U

k+1(y) ≥ 0, for all y ∈ R+, for all k = 1, . . . ,K − 1.
• A3:

U

k(y)− U

k+1(y)

≤ 0, for all y ∈ R+, for all k = 1, . . . ,K − 1.
• A4: Uk (y)− Uk+1 (y) ≤ 0, for all y ∈ R+, for all k = 1, . . . ,K − 1.
Assumption A1 is standard: the marginal utility of income –called social priority in
the sequel, as it tells us where to put our money first when maximizing the sum of
utilities– of all household types is positive, but decreases with income. Assumption A2
requires the social priority to be higher for more needy households, but A3 says that
the difference in social priority between adjacent types decreases with income. Finally,
A4 is a condition to deal with changing demographics: more needy households are worse
off compared to less needy households with the same household income. Bourguignon
(1989) considers assumptions A1-A2, Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) A1-A3 and
Moyes (1999) A1-A4.
Following Ebert (2000), we can also interpret conditions A1-A3 in terms of money
transfers between households. A1a –known as the Pareto condition– ensures that
more income improves social welfare, whereas A1b–known as the Pigou-Dalton transfer
principle– tells us that an income transfer from a rich to a poor household with the
same type increases welfare. Adding A2, requires that transferring money from a rich to
a poor household increases social welfare, as long as the poor household is more needy.
Adding A3, ensures that transferring money from a rich to a poor household with the
same type would increase social welfare more, when these households are more needy.
We denote with U the family of utility profiles (U1, ..., UK) satisfying assumptions A1-A4.
We say that a distribution F welfare dominates G according to the family U , denoted
F ? G if and only if the welfare difference ∆W = W (F ) −W (G) is positive for all
profiles in U . The following theorem shows how welfare dominance can be implemented
via sequential dominance conditions. Define functions H1k , H
2
k on R+, for all k ∈ K, as
H1k (y) = pkFk (y)− qkGk (y) , and H2k (y) =
] y
0
H1k . (2)
We obtain (an explanation follows):
Theorem 1. Consider two heterogeneous distributions F and G defined over a common
finite support [0, z]. We have F ? G⇔
k[
i=1
H1i (z) ≤ 0 for all k ∈ K, and (3)
k[
i=1
H2i (y) ≤ 0 for all y in [0, z] and for all k ∈ K. (4)
Proof. See Moyes (1999); see also the proof of proposition 2, as it contains theorem 1
as a special case. ?
According to the conditions in (3), we have to check first whether the proportion of
most needy households is smaller in F compared to G, second, whether the proportion
of most and second most needy households is smaller in F compared to G, and so on.
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The conditions in (4) test for second-order stochastic dominance in the same sequential
way. Notice that the test in theorem 1 reduces to the sequential generalized Lorenz
dominance test, whenever demographics are the same in both distributions.
3.2 Introducing bounds
The traditional sequential dominance criterion, described in the previous subsection,
cannot deal with transfers from rich households to poor but less needier households.
The main problem is assumption A2, as it allows for utility profiles where, for example,
a couple with ten times the income of a single has a higher social priority. Fleurbaey
et al.’s (2001) contribution consists of introducing more reasonable lower and upper
bounds.
Lower and upper bound vectors will be denoted by α=(α1, . . . ,αK) and β=(β1, . . . ,βK);
they satisfy βk ≥ αk ≥ 1 for all k ∈ K and for the reference type, type K, we choose
βK = αK = 1. Fleurbaey et al. (2001) replace Bourguignon’s (1989) assumption A2 by
the bounded assumptions A2α and A2β (an explanation follows):
• A2α : U k(αky)− U

k+1(y) ≥ 0, for all y ∈ R+, for all k = 1, . . . ,K − 1.
• A2β : U k(βky)− U

k+1(y) ≤ 0, for all y ∈ R+, for all k = 1, . . . ,K − 1.
A2α (resp. A2β) tells us that a household with type k has a higher (resp. lower) social
priority compared to a household with type k + 1, if the former’s household income is
sufficiently low (resp. high), i.e., lower (resp. higher)1 or equal to αk (resp. βk) times
the latter’s household income.
To extend Fleurbaey et al.’s (2001) analysis into the direction of Atkinson and Bour-
guignon (1987), it seems natural to replace assumption A3 by assumptions A3α and A3β,
which require that the (positive) differences in social priority, described in assumptions
A2α and A2β, decrease with income:
• A3α :

U

k(αky)− U

k+1(y)

≤ 0, for all y ∈ R+, for all k = 1, . . . ,K − 1.
• A3β :

U

k(βky)− U

k+1(y)

≥ 0, for all y ∈ R+, for all k = 1, . . . ,K − 1.
Finally, to deal with changing demographics, we replace A4 by assumptions A4α and
A4β (an explanation follows):
• A4α : Uk (αky)− Uk+1 (y) ≤ 0, for all y ∈ R+, for all k = 1, . . . ,K − 1.
• A4β : Uk (βky)− Uk+1 (y) ≥ 0, for all y ∈ R+, for all k = 1, . . . ,K − 1.
Assumption A4α (resp. A4β) tells us that a household with type k is worse off (resp. bet-
ter off) compared to a household with type k + 1, if the former’s household income is
sufficiently low (resp. high), i.e., lower (resp. higher) or equal to αk (resp. βk) times the
latter’s household income.
In the next section, we focus on the following quasi-orderings:
1For this interpretation to be correct, we need A1 to be satisfied.
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?α : welfare dominance based on Uα = {(U1, . . . , UK) satisfying A1, A2α, A3α, A4α} ,
?β : welfare dominance based on Uβ = (U1, . . . , UK) satisfying A1, A2β, A3β, A4β ,
?βα : welfare dominance based on Uβα = Uα ∩ Uβ.
4 Results
Our first result tells us that our attempt to find an intermediate criterion in between
Ebert’s cardinal and Atkinson and Bourguignon’s ordinal approach is unsatisfactory, as
it results, at best, in an average household income criterion. Notice that (i) assumptions
A4α and A4β do not play a role in proposition 1 and (ii) proposition 1 does not hold
when α = β, as it would lead to Ebert’s cardinal approach.
Proposition 1. The household utility functions in a profile (U1, . . . , UK) satisfying A1,
A2α, A2β, A3α, and A3β for some lower and upper bound vectors
β =

β1, . . . ,βK−1, 1

> α = (α1, . . . ,αK−1, 1) ≥ (1, . . . , 1) ,
have the following form:
Uk : R+ → R : y :→ ak + by, with ak ∈ R and b ∈ R+.
Proof. See appendix. ?
As a consequence, the criterion ?βα cannot make reasonable heterogeneous welfare com-
parisons. In the sequel, we look at the quasi-orderings ?α and ?β, which are based
either on lower or upper bounds.
We need two new definitions. For all k ∈ K, define the lower and upper bound equiv-
alence scale with respect to type K (the reference type) as α∗k =
TK
i=k αi and β
∗
k =TK
i=k βi; α
∗ and β∗ are the corresponding vectors. Define functions H2k and H
2
k on R+
for all k ∈ K as
H2k (y) =
] y
0
α∗kH
1
k (α
∗
kx) dx and H
2
k (y) =
] y
0
β∗kH
1
k (β
∗
kx) dx. (5)
We obtain (an explanation follows):
Proposition 2. Consider two heterogeneous distributions F and G defined over a com-
mon finite support [0, z] and lower and upper bound vectors β =

β1, . . . ,βK−1, 1

≥
α = (α1, . . . ,αK−1, 1) ≥ (1, . . . , 1).
1. F ?α G⇔
k[
i=1
H1i (z) ≤ 0 for all k ∈ K, and (6)
k[
i=1
H2i (y) ≤ 0 for all y in [0, z] and for all k ∈ K. (7)
5
2. F ?β G⇔
K[
i=k
H1i (z) ≤ 0 for all k ∈ K, and (8)
K[
i=k
H
2
i (y) ≤ 0 for all y in [0, z] and for all k ∈ K. (9)
Proof. See appendix. ?
First, in (8) and (9), the sequential procedure is the opposite as the usual one (as in (6)
and (7)), i.e., one has to check a certain condition first for type K households, then for
type K and K−1 together, and so on. To put it differently, type K is considered worst-
off, followed by type K − 1, and so on. This stands to reason: dividing incomes by the
upper bound equivalence scale (see definition H
2
k), makes type k + 1 households worse
off compared to type k households with the same equivalent income (see assumption
A2β).
Second, the sequential conditions (6) and (8) boil down to comparing proportions of
households with certain need types between the distributions; they are due to the general
way in which we deal with changing demographics as in Moyes (1999).
Third, the sequential dominance conditions in (7) and (9) differ from (4) in two respects,
which can best be seen from the definitions of H2k and H
2
k in equation (5): the sequential
dominance conditions of proposition 2 are (i) applied to equivalized incomes, either via
the lower bound equivalence scales (in (7)) or via the upper bound equivalence scales
(in (9)), and (ii) weighted by the equivalence scales as in Ebert (1997,1999).
Fourth, choosing α = (1, . . . , 1), ?α equals Moyes’ criterion ? of theorem 1. In case
households only differ in household size, we could choose β∗ equal to household size
vector with a single as the reference type K. In this case, the sequential dominance
conditions in (9) reduce to a reversed sequential dominance criterion based on per-
capita household incomes and weighted by household size.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
As α 9= β, there must exist a k < K such that αk 9= βk. Evaluating equations A2α and
A2β for k at y = 0, we have
U

k(0) = U

k+1(0). (10)
A3α and (10) imply U

k(αky) ≤ U

k+1(y), for all y ∈ R+; together with A2α, we must
have U

k(αky) = U

k+1(y), for all y ∈ R+. Analogously, using A2β, A3β and (10) we
must have U

k(βky) = U

k+1(y), for all y ∈ R+. Both results together, we get
U

k(αky) = U

k(βky), for all y ∈ R+. (11)
Equation (11) and αk 9= βk are compatible if and only if
U

k(y) = b, for all y ∈ R+, with b ≥ 0 (from A1). (12)
We now show how equation (12) extends to all other types in K\ {k}.
1. Downwards. If k 9= 1, rewrite assumptions A2α and A2β for k − 1 as
U

k−1(y) ≥ U

k(
y
αk−1
) and U

k−1(y) ≤ U

k(
y
βk−1
) for all y ∈ R+. (13)
Combining (12) and (13), we have
U

k−1(y) = b, for all y ∈ R+. (14)
We can proceed downwards in this way until
U

1(y) = . . . = U

k−1(y) = b, for all y ∈ R+. (15)
2. Upwards. Use assumptions A2α and A2β for k < K:
U

k(αky) ≥ U

k+1(y) and U

k(βky) ≤ U

k+1(y) for all y ∈ R+. (16)
Combining (12) and (16), we have
U

k+1(y) = b, for all y ∈ R+. (17)
We can proceed upwards in this way, until
U

k+1(y) = . . . = U

K(y) = b, for all y ∈ R+. (18)
Integrating equations (12), (15) and (18) leads to the desired result.
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Proof of proposition 2
Case 1: Lower bounds
Sufficiency: The difference in welfare between two distributions F and G equals:
∆W =
[
k∈K
] z
0
Ukd (pkFk − qkGk)
a
=
[
k∈K
] z
0
UkdH
1
k (19)
b
=
[
k∈K
] α∗kz
0
UkdH
1
k
c
=
[
k∈K
] z
0
Uk (α
∗
ky) dH
1
k (α
∗
ky) . (20)
where we use (a) the definition ofH1k , (b) the fact that dH
1
k equals zero for incomes larger
than z, and (c) a change of variable. In addition, using (d and f) partial integration,
(e) the definition of H2k and the fact that H
1
k (α
∗
kz) = H
1
k (z), we obtain
∆W
d
=
[
k∈K
Uk (α
∗
kz)H
1
k (α
∗
kz) −
[
k∈K
] z
0
U

k (α
∗
ky)α
∗
kH
1
k (α
∗
ky) dy (21)
e
=
[
k∈K
Uk (α
∗
kz)H
1
k (z)
 ~} 
A
−
[
k∈K
] z
0
U

k (α
∗
ky) dH
2
k (y)
 ~} 
B
, with (22)
B
f
=
[
k∈K
U

k (α
∗
kz)H
2
k (z)
 ~} 
B1
−
] z
0
#[
k∈K
α∗kU

k (α
∗
ky)H
2
k (y)
$
 ~} 
B2(y)
dy. (23)
Using Abel’s lemma,2 using
SK
i=1H
1
i (z) = 0 and α
∗
K = αK = 1, we can rewrite A, B1,
and B2 (y) as
A =
SK−1
k=1
k
Uk (α
∗
kz)− Uk+1

α∗k+1z
 Sk
i=1H
1
i (z)
l
,
B1 =
SK−1
k=1
k
U

k (α
∗
kz)− U

k+1

α∗k+1z
Sk
i=1H
2
i (z)
l
+ U

K (z)
SK
i=1H
2
i (z)

, and,
B2 (y) =
SK−1
k=1
k
α∗kU

k (α
∗
ky)− α∗k+1U

k+1

α∗k+1y
Sk
i=1H
2
i (y)
l
+ U

K (y)
SK
i=1H
2
i (y) .
As ∆W = A−B1+
U z
0 B2 (y) dy has to be positive for all profiles satisfying assumptions
A1, A2α, A3α and A4α, it is easy to check sufficiency of the sequential dominance
conditions defined in equations (6-7).
Necessity:
1.We first show that
Sk
i=1H
1
k (z) ≤ 0 for all k = 1, . . . ,K are necessary conditions. Sup-
pose ∆W ≥ 0 for all utility profiles in Uα, but there exist a k such that
Sk
i=1H
1
i (z) > 0.
Choose a utility profile (U1, . . . , UK) such that
[U : y :→ C < 0] = U1 = . . . = Uk < Uk+1 = . . . = UK = [V : y :→ 0] .
2Consider two vectors u, v ∈ RK . Abel’s lemma says that
[
k∈K
ukvk =
K−1[
k=1
%
(uk − uk+1)
#
k[
i=1
vi
$&
+ uK
[
i∈K
vi.
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This profile belongs to Uα. The welfare difference for this profile equals
∆W =
K[
i=1
] z
0
UidH
1
i =
k[
i=1
] z
0
CdH1i = C
#
k[
i=1
H1i (z)
$
< 0,
a contradiction.
2. Suppose∆W ≥ 0 for all utility profiles in Uα, but there exist a k such that
Sk
i=1H
2
i >
0 on a certain non-degenerate income interval [a, b], which belongs to [0, z]. Choose a
utility profile (U1, . . . , UK) consisting of twice differentiable utility functions such that



U1 :



U

1 = C > 0 (and thus U

1 = 0), for y ≤ α∗1a
U

1 < 0, for α
∗
1a ≤ y ≤ α∗1b
U1 = 0 (and thus U

1 = U

1 = 0), for y ≥ α∗1b
,
U2 : y :→ 1α1U1 (α1y) =
α∗2
α∗1
U1

α∗1
α∗2
y

,
U3 : y :→ 1α2U2 (α2y) =
1
α1α2U1 (α1α2y) =
α∗3
α∗1
U1

α∗1
α∗3
y

,
. . .
Uk : y :→
α∗k
α∗1
U1

α∗1
α∗k
y

,
Uk+1 = . . . = UK : y :→ 0.
This profile belongs to Uα. The welfare difference for this profile equals
∆W =
K[
i=1
] z
0
UidH
1
i
a
=
K[
i=1
] α∗i z
0
UidH
1
i
b
=
k[
i=1
] α∗i z
0
α∗i
α∗1
U1

α∗1
α∗i
y

dH1i (y)
c
=
k[
i=1
] α∗i b
0
α∗i
α∗1
U1

α∗1
α∗i
y

dH1i (y) ,
where we use (a) the fact that dH1k equals zero for incomes larger than z, (b) the
definition of the functions in our profile, and (c) the fact that U1

α∗1
α∗i
y

equals zero for
incomes larger than α∗i b. Furthermore, using (d and g) partial integration, (e), a change
of variable, (f) the definition of H2i , and (h) the fact that U

1 is zero for incomes lower
than α∗1a, we obtain subsequently
∆W
d
=U1 (α
∗
1b) ~} 
0
#
k[
i=1
α∗i
α∗1
H1i (α
∗
i b)
$
−
k[
i=1
] α∗i b
0
U

1

α∗1
α∗i
y

H1i (y) dy
e
= −
k[
i=1
] b
0
U

1 (α
∗
1y)α
∗
iH
1
i (α
∗
i y) dy
f
= −
k[
i=1
] b
0
U

1 (α
∗
1y) dH
2
i (y)
g
= − U 1 (α∗1b) ~} 
0
#
k[
i=1
H2i (b)
$
+
] b
0
α∗1U

1 (α
∗
1y)
#
k[
i=1
H2i (y)
$
dy
h
=
] b
a
α∗1U

1 (α
∗
1y)
#
k[
i=1
H2i (y)
$
dy,
which is strictly negative and thus contradicts ∆W ≥ 0.
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Case 2: Upper bounds
Sufficiency: The difference in welfare between two distributions F and G equals:
∆W =
[
k∈K
] z
0
Ukd (pkFk − qkGk)
a
=
[
k∈K
] z
0
UkdH
1
k (24)
b
=
[
k∈K
] β∗kz
0
UkdH
1
k
c
=
[
k∈K
] z
0
Uk (β
∗
ky) dH
1
k (β
∗
ky) . (25)
steps (a) to (c) are the same as in case 1 (sufficiency). As in case (1), we proceed
by using (d and f) partial integration, and (e) the definition of H
2
k and the fact that
H1k (β
∗
kz) = H
1
k (z), to get subsequently:
∆W
d
=
[
k∈K
Uk (β
∗
kz)H
1
k (z) −
[
k∈K
] z
0
U

k (β
∗
ky)β
∗
kH
1
k (β
∗
ky) dy (26)
e
=
[
k∈K
Uk (β
∗
kz)H
1
k (z)
 ~} 
A
−
[
k∈K
] z
0
U

k (β
∗
ky) dH
2
k (y)
 ~} 
B
, with (27)
B
f
=
[
k∈K
U

k (β
∗
kz)H
2
k (z)
 ~} 
B1
−
] z
0
#[
k∈K
β∗kU

k (β
∗
ky)H
2
k (y)
$
 ~} 
B2(y)
dy. (28)
Using Abel’s lemma in exactly the opposite way3 as well as the fact that
SK
i=1H
1
k (z) = 0
and β∗K = βK = 1, we can rewrite parts A, B1, and B2 (y) as
A =
SK−1
k=1
k
Uk+1

β∗k+1z

− Uk (β∗kz)
 SK
i=k+1H
1
i (z)
l
,
B1 =
SK−1
k=1
k
U

k+1

β∗k+1z

− U k (β∗kz)
SK
i=k+1H
2
i (z)
l
+ U

1 (z)
SK
i=1H
2
i (z)

, and,
B2 (y) =
SK−1
k=1
k
β∗k+1U

k+1

β∗k+1z

− β∗kU

k (β
∗
kz)
SK
i=k+1H
2
i (y)
l
+ U

1 (y)
SK
i=1H
2
i (y) .
As ∆W = A−B1+
U z
0 B2 (y) dy has to be positive for all profiles satisfying assumptions
A1, A2β, A3β, and A4β, it is easy to check sufficiency of the sequential dominance
conditions defined in equations (8-9).
Necessity:
1.We first show that
SK
i=kH
1
k (z) ≤ 0 for all k = 1, . . . ,K are necessary conditions. Sup-
pose ∆W ≥ 0 for all utility profiles in Uβ, but there exist a k such thatSKi=kH1i (z) > 0.
Choose a utility profile (U1, . . . , UK) with
[V : y :→ 0] = U1 = . . . = Uk−1 > Uk = . . . = UK = [U : y :→ C < 0] .
3Consider two vectors u, v ∈ RK . Here we use Abel’s lemma as follows:
[
k∈K
ukvk =
K−1[
k=1
%
(uk+1 − uk)
#
K[
i=k+1
vi
$&
+ u1
[
i∈K
vi.
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For this profile, which belongs to Uβ, the welfare difference can be rewritten as
∆W =
K[
i=1
] z
0
UidH
1
i =
K[
i=k
] z
0
CdH1i = C
#
K[
i=k
H1i (z)
$
< 0,
a contradiction.
2. Suppose∆W ≥ 0 for all utility profiles in Uβ, but there exist a k such thatSKi=kH
2
i >
0 on a certain non-degenerate income interval [a, b], which belongs to [0, z]. Choose a
utility profile (U1, . . . , UK) parametrized by α > 0 in the following way:



UK : y :→



(2α (b− a) + 1) y, for y ≤ a
−αy2 + (2αb+ 1) y − αa2, for a ≤ y ≤ b
y + α

b2 − a2

, for y ≥ b
,
UK−1 : y :→ βK−1UK

y
βK−1

= β∗K−1UK

y
β∗K−1

,
UK−2 : y :→ βK−2UK−1

y
βK−2

= β∗K−2UK

y
β∗K−2

,
. . .
Uk : y :→ βkUk+1

y
βk

= . . . = β∗kUK

y
β∗k

,
Uk−1 = . . . = U1 : y :→ y + β∗kα

b2 − a2

.
The function UK –and thus also the functions UK−1, . . . , Uk– as well as the functions
Uk−1 = . . . = U1 are twice differentiable and positively valued. Moreover, this profile
belongs to Uβ, irrespective of α > 0, which defines the degree of concavity of UK .
Independent of the value of α, there exists an income vector (z1, . . . , zK) with all zk ≥
max (z,β∗kb) such that
Uk (zk) = U , for all k ∈ K and U

k (zk) = 1, for all k ∈ K.
The welfare difference for this profile equals
∆W =
K[
i=1
] z
0
UidH
1
i
a
=
K[
i=1
] zi
0
UidH
1
i
b
=
K[
i=1
Ui (zi)H
1
i (zi)−
K[
i=1
] zi
0
U

iH
1
i
c
= −
K[
i=1
] zi
0
U

iH
1
i
d
= −
K[
i=1
] zi
β∗
i
0
U

i (β
∗
i y)H
1
i (β
∗
i y) d (β
∗
i y)
e
= −
K[
i=1
] zi
β∗
i
0
U

i (β
∗
i y) dH
2
i (y)
f
= −
K[
i=1
H
2
i

zi
β∗i

+
K[
i=k
] b
a
β∗iU

i (β
∗
i y)H
2
i (y) dy
g
= −
K[
i=1
H
2
i

zi
β∗i

− α
] b
a
#
K[
i=k
H
2
i (y)
$
dy,
where we use (a) the fact that dH1k equals zero above z, (b) partial integration, (c) the
fact that Ui (zi) = U and
SK
i=1H
1
i (zi) =
SK
i=1H
1
i (z) = 0, (d) a change of variable, (e)
11
the definition of H
2
k, (f) partial integration, U

i (zi) = 1 for all i ∈ K and the fact that
–for all i = 1, . . . , k− 1– U i equals zero and –for all other i = k, . . . ,K– U

i equals
zero for incomes lower (resp. higher) than β∗i a (resp. β
∗
i b), and (g) the fact that –for
all i = k, . . . ,K−1– β∗iU

i (β
∗
i y) = U

K (y) = −α for incomes y in [a, b]. The right-hand
side of (g) can be made arbitrarily low by increasing α, thus strictly negative as well,
which contradicts ∆W ≥ 0.
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